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FCC v. Fox Television Stations and the Role of Logical 
Error in Hard Look Review 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Logical reasoning plays an important but delicate role in the 
American legal system. We expect the branches of government 
responsible for applying the law—the judicial and executive 
branches—to do so faithfully. Their actions have concrete 
consequences for real people, and, therefore, we expect such actions 
to be supported with valid, logical reasoning. Of course, we also 
hope the legislative branch selects its policies after exploring the 
options and that it uses logic to choose those that make the most 
sense, but the inherent uncertainties surrounding policy decisions 
and the legislature’s political accountability for bad choices perhaps 
demand less logical rigor in the policymaking process. 
Administrative agencies, however, occupy a unique position in 
the American legal system. Agencies are not directly accountable to 
the people as are Congress and the President,1 yet their power 
embraces executive, legislative, and even judicial authority. The 
political checks that ensure Congress does not stray too far from 
reason, therefore, are perhaps less effective against agencies as 
policymakers. Independent agencies are even more insulated from 
political pressure—their officials may enjoy tenure of office and are 
therefore free from an important source of control from the 
President.2 Considering the broad power exercised by administrative 
agencies and the reduced political accountability, surely we must 
expect this “fourth branch”3 of government to exercise good 
reasoning in administering the laws. 
 
 1. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 
(1984). 
 2. While there have been those who challenge the constitutionality of independent 
agencies ever since the Supreme Court upheld them in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 
see, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 
104 YALE L.J. 541, 582 (1994), the Court has yet to seriously entertain the possibility that 
Humphrey’s Executor should be overruled. 
 3. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports, 535 U.S. 743, 773 (2002) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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In fact, Congress has taken steps to ensure that administrative 
agencies adhere to logical reasoning, at least to some extent. The 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) prescribes certain procedures 
that agencies must follow in rulemaking and adjudications4 and 
makes agency decisions reviewable by the courts.5 While formal 
rulemaking and adjudicatory decisions must be borne out completely 
by the evidence developed in an administrative record,6 more 
informal decisions are upheld as long as they are not “arbitrary, 
capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.”7 Thus, even if an agency is 
not always required to justify its decision with hard evidence, it must 
offer some non-arbitrary justification for its decisions. 
But how rigorous must the agency’s logic process be to convince 
a court that its decision is not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion? Certainly, the agency must offer some explanation for its 
action that does not defy logic,8 but even courts—the bastions of 
logic in the American legal system—often indulge in informal 
fallacies without batting an eye.9 Thus, it would not be surprising to 
discover that the courts are willing to tolerate some degree of error 
in the logical processes of administrative decision-making. 
This Note explores one of the Supreme Court’s most recent 
cases reviewing an agency’s exercise of policymaking discretion and 
the role of logic in that process. In FCC v. Fox Television Stations,10 
the Court heard a challenge to the Federal Communication 
Commission’s (“FCC”) decision to change its policy regarding the 
prohibition of broadcast indecency and profanity. Following a 
number of complaints for broadcasts of the “F-Word” during live 
broadcasts, the FCC abandoned its earlier policy that held that 
broadcasts of fleeting expletives did not amount to indecent 
speech.11  
 
 4. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 
4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (2009). 
 5. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06 (2006). 
 6. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2006). 
 7. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). 
 8. See David H. Becker, Changing Direction in Administrative Agency Rulemaking: 
“Reasoned Analysis,” The Roadless Rule Repeal, and the 2006 National Park Service 
Management Policies, 30 ENVIRONS: ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 65, 69–70 (2006). 
 9. See generally BRETT G. SCHARFFS, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF LOGIC (forthcoming). 
 10. 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). 
 11. Id. at 1807–08. 
DO NOT DELETE 4/16/2010  3:52 PM 
687 FCC v. Fox Television Stations 
 689 
While all of the Justices purported to agree that a heightened 
standard of review is not necessary, the Court sharply divided on 
what the “arbitrary or capricious” standard required in this case.12 
The majority upheld the FCC’s decision, ignoring and, at times, 
endorsing logically fallacious arguments put forward by the FCC. 
This treatment of the FCC’s explanation for its decision signals a 
willingness on the part of the Court to overlook informal errors in 
agency reasoning, at least when the agency decision does not ignore 
factual findings. This relaxation of “hard look” review may, in turn, 
allow agencies that desire to change policy for purely political reasons 
to do so as long as they can provide some justification that does not 
completely defy logic. 
This Note proceeds as follows: Part II reviews the FCC’s history 
in regulating broadcast indecency and profanity and introduces Fox 
Television Stations. Part III explains the principles of hard look 
review that guide review of informal agency policymaking decisions. 
Part IV discusses the logical errors employed by the FCC in 
defending its decision to change its broadcast indecency policy and 
suggests that the logically flawed justification it provided may have 
masked primarily political motivations. Part V offers a brief 
conclusion. 
II. FCC REGULATION OF BROADCAST INDECENCY AND PROFANITY 
The FCC is an independent federal agency “charged with 
regulating interstate and international communications by radio, 
television, wire, satellite and cable.”13 The FCC’s five Commissioners 
are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate to serve 
five-year terms, and no more than three Commissioners may be 
members of the same political party.14 While the President designates 
the FCC chairman,15 he has no authority to remove Commissioners 
without cause and, therefore, has no formal power to direct the FCC 
in its regulatory activities. 
The FCC’s organic statute, the Communications Act of 1934, 
established the FCC and created a system whereby private entities 
 
 12. See id. at 1810–11 n.2. 
 13. Federal Communications Commission, About the FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/ 
aboutus.html. 
 14. Id. 
 15. 47 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006). 
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may obtain limited-term broadcast licenses.16 The licensing system 
ensures that the United States “maintain[s] . . . control . . . over all 
the channels of radio transmissions,” while granting persons the use 
of those channels.17 The government’s ability to control the content 
of broadcasts is limited, however, by statute and the First 
Amendment. The Communications Act proclaims: 
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give 
the Commission the power of censorship over the radio 
communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no 
regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the 
Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by 
means of radio communication.18 
However, while the FCC may not engage in censorship, Congress 
has also forbidden by criminal statute the “utter[ance] [of] any 
obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio 
communication”19 and has instructed the FCC to enforce this 
prohibition for broadcasts made on public television between the 
hours of 6 a.m. and 10 p.m.20 
A. Pacifica and Its Aftermath 
While the indecency ban has been on the books since 1934, the 
FCC did not invoke it until 1975, when it found a daytime 
broadcast of George Carlin’s monologue, “Filthy Words,” to be 
 
 16. 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2000, Supp. V). 
 17. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000); see also CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981) (“A 
licensed broadcaster is granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the 
public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened by enforceable public 
obligations.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Office of Commc’n of United 
Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (1966))). 
 18. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2006). 
 19. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006). 
 20. Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, P.L. 102-356 § 16(a), 106 Stat. 954 
(1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303, note) (“The Federal Communications Commission shall 
promulgate regulations to prohibit the broadcasting of indecent programming—(1) between 6 
a.m. and 10 p.m. on any day by any public radio station or public television station that goes 
off the air at or before 12 midnight; and (2) between 6 a.m. and 12 midnight on any day for 
any radio or television broadcasting station not described in paragraph (1).”). The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia has held the prohibition on indecent speech between 
the hours of 10 p.m. and midnight unconstitutional. Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 
58 F.3d 654, 669–70 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1043 (1996). 
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actionably indecent.21 In defining the term “indecent,” the FCC 
concluded that the concept is “intimately connected with the 
exposure of children to language that describes, in terms patently 
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the 
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times 
of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the 
audience.”22  
Significantly, this definition of “indecent” differs from the 
definition of “obscene,” and therefore includes language that is 
indisputably subject to some degree of First Amendment 
protection.23 The FCC reasoned that indecent language, when 
broadcast at a time when children are likely to be in the audience, 
was similar to a public nuisance, and should, therefore, generally be 
regulated using nuisance principles.24 Thus, while the definition of 
“indecent” should not depend on the audience, a different standard 
would perhaps be appropriate “[w]hen the number of children in the 
audience is reduced to a minimum.”25 
The radio station that had broadcast the monologue challenged 
the FCC’s order, but failed to convince the Supreme Court either 
that section 1464 only prohibited obscene language, or that the 
statute as applied violated the First Amendment.26 In FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation, the Court upheld the FCC’s definition of “indecent,” 
and concluded that the statute, as applied in that case, did not 
impermissibly infringe the radio station’s freedom of speech.27 In his 
majority opinion, Justice Stevens concluded by emphasizing the 
narrowness of the Court’s opinion: “We have not decided that an 
occasional expletive in [a two-way radio conversation or a telecast of 
 
 21. Citizen’s Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 
1975 WL 29897 (1975). 
 22. Id. ¶ 11. 
 23. The FCC explicitly disavowed its prior decisions that had defined “indecent” in 
terms of an earlier formulation of obscenity. Id. ¶ 10 (“The Commission did offer a definition 
in WUHY-FM, but relied substantially on the then existing definition of obscenity. In view of 
subsequent decisions (Miller and Illinois Citizens), we are reformulating the concept of 
‘indecent.’” (citations omitted)). 
 24. Id. ¶ 11. 
 25. Id. ¶ 12. 
 26. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
 27. Id. at 747–51. 
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an Elizabethan comedy] . . . would justify any sanction or, indeed, 
that this broadcast would justify a criminal prosecution.”28  
Justice Powell further emphasized the narrowness of the Court’s 
opinion in his concurrence. He, joined by Justice Blackmun, both of 
whom were necessary to form a majority, made it clear that “[t]he 
Commission’s holding, and certainly the Court’s holding today, does 
not speak to cases involving the isolated use of a potentially offensive 
word in the course of a radio broadcast, as distinguished from the 
verbal shock treatment administered by respondent here.”29 
The FCC responded to the Court’s signals in Pacifica by 
developing a fairly narrow enforcement policy over the next several 
years.30 In particular, the FCC distinguished between literal uses of 
offensive words that have to do with sex or excretion and expletive 
uses of those words.31 The FCC stated, “If a complaint focuses solely 
on the use of expletives, we believe that under the legal standards set 
forth in Pacifica, deliberate and repetitive use in a patently offensive 
manner is a requisite to a finding of indecency.”32 Whereas fleeting 
uses of offensive words in a nonliteral sense would not constitute 
indecency, actual “description or depiction of sexual or excretory 
functions” would be “examined in context to determine whether it is 
patently offensive under contemporary community standards 
applicable to the broadcast medium.”33 
Thus, after Pacifica, the FCC took a very cautious approach to 
regulating broadcast speech. Indeed, while the statute prohibits both 
indecent and profane speech, the FCC eschewed any interpretation 
of profanity that would encompass speech that was not also indecent 
or obscene, holding that “[p]rofanity that does not fall under one of 
the above two categories is fully protected by the First Amendment 
 
 28. Id. at 750. 
 29. Id. at 760–61 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 30. See Application of WGBH Educ. Found., 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, 1254, ¶ 10, 1978 WL 
36042 (1978) (expressing its “inten[tion] strictly to observe the narrowness of the Pacifica 
holding”); Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, 2699, ¶ 12, 1987 WL 345577 (1987) 
(holding that enforcement power not limited to “deliberate, repetitive use of the seven words 
actually contained in the George Carlin monologue”); Id. ¶ 13 (preserving distinction 
between literal and nonliteral uses of evocative language and suggesting that “deliberate and 
repetitive use . . . is a requisite to a finding of indecency” when complaint focuses solely on 
expletive use). 
 31. Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, 2699 ¶ 13 (1987). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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and cannot be regulated.”34 In sum, after Pacifica, the test for 
indecency prescribed a two-prong analysis. The FCC and reviewing 
courts must ask two questions: (1) whether the language, in context, 
depicts or describes sexual or excretory activities or organs, and (2) 
whether it does so in terms patently offensive as measured by 
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium.35 
B. The FCC Changes Course 
On March 3, 2004, the FCC adopted an opinion and order (the 
Golden Globes Order) holding that daytime broadcasts of single or 
fleeting uses of the “F-Word,” “S-Word,” and other profanities “as 
highly offensive as the ‘F-Word’” would no longer be tolerated.36 
The case arose after the FCC received several complaints alleging 
that the 2003 Golden Globes Awards program included a broadcast 
of the singer Bono saying, “[T]his is really, really, fucking brilliant. 
Really, really great.”37 The Enforcement Bureau, applying the 
“fleeting expletives exception,” had found that the material “did not 
describe, in context, sexual or excretory organs or activities and that 
the utterance was fleeting and isolated.”38 On appeal, the FCC found 
that the utterance constituted both actionable indecency and 
profanity, and announced that the fleeting expletives exception is 
“no longer good law.”39 
In analyzing the question whether Bono’s statement constituted 
indecency, the FCC applied the two-prong test developed from 
Pacifica. First, it determined that, “given the core meaning of the 
‘F-Word,’ any use of that word or a variation, in any context, 
inherently has a sexual connotation, and therefore falls within the 
first prong of our indecency definition.”40 The FCC asserted that its 
conclusion was consistent with the original Pacifica decision, “in 
which the Commission held that the ‘F-Word’ does depict or 
 
 34. FCC, THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING (1999), available at 1999 WL 391297 
(F.C.C.). 
 35. Industry Guidance on the Commission’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 
and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 8002 (2001). 
 36. Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the 
“Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4981 (2004) [hereinafter Golden Globes 
Order]. 
 37. Id. at 4976 n.4. 
 38. Id. at 4975–76. 
 39. Id. at 4980–81. 
 40. Id. at 4978 (emphasis added). 
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describe sexual activities.”41 The FCC also found that the language 
was “patently offensive under contemporary community standards 
for the broadcast medium.”42 The FCC argued that, as one of the 
“most vulgar, graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in 
the English language,” use of the “F-Word” “invariably invokes a 
coarse sexual image.”43 In the Golden Globes case, its use was 
“shocking and gratuitous” and lacked any “political, scientific or 
other independent value . . . or any other factors to mitigate its 
offensiveness.”44 The FCC feared that failing to take action against 
isolated uses of such language “would likely lead to more widespread 
use of the offensive language.”45 
Finally, the FCC asserted that its decision was “not inconsistent 
with the Supreme Court ruling in Pacifica” because the Court had 
“left open the issue of whether an occasional expletive could be 
considered indecent.”46 While the FCC justified its decision with 
reference to Pacifica, it conceded that its holding constituted a 
change in FCC policy, both in terms of indecency law and profanity 
law.47 Because the broadcast would not have been actionable under 
the FCC’s previous standards, it declined to impose sanctions against 
the offending broadcast licensees.48 
Following the Golden Globes Order, the FCC issued notices of 
apparent liability for several broadcasts aired between 2002 and 2005 
that it deemed actionably indecent, but again refrained from 
imposing sanctions.49 After a remand from the Second Circuit to 
 
 41. Id. For an analysis of this argument as a vicious abstraction, see infra Part IV.A.1. 
 42. Golden Globes Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4979 (2004). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 4982. 
 47. Id. at 4980 (“In Pacifica Foundation, Inc., 2 FCC Rcd 2698, 2699 (1987) . . . the 
Commission stated as follows: ‘If a complaint focuses solely on the use of expletives, we believe 
that . . . deliberate and repetitive use in a patently offensive manner is a requisite to a finding of 
indecency.’ . . . We now depart from this portion of the Commission’s 1987 Pacifica decision 
as well as . . . any similar cases holding that isolated or fleeting use of the ‘F-Word’ or a variant 
thereof in situations such as this is not indecent and conclude that such cases are not good law 
to that extent.”). The FCC’s new rule regarding profanity itself has serious First Amendment 
implications as well as implications for hard look review. However, because in Fox Television 
Stations neither the parties nor the Supreme Court focused on the FCC’s new profanity rule, 
this Note also defers that discussion to another day. 
 48. Id. at 4981–82. 
 49. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1808–10 (2009). 
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allow the licensees to contest the decisions, the FCC upheld most of 
its findings of indecency.50 Two of these broadcasts involved 
programs aired by Fox Television Stations—the 2002 Billboard 
Music Awards and the 2003 Billboard Music Awards.51 Fox had 
failed to “bleep out” offensive language uttered by Cher as she 
accepted an award in the 2002 show, and by Nicole Richie as an 
awards presenter in the 2003 broadcast.52 While the FCC in its 
Remand Order contended that the broadcasts would have been 
actionable prior to the Golden Globes Order,53 the Golden Globes 
Order removed any doubt that the language was actionable.54  
In justifying its findings under the Golden Globes Order, the FCC 
rejected any “strict dichotomy between ‘expletives’ and ‘descriptions 
or depictions of sexual or excretory functions’” because “an 
‘expletive’s’ power to offend derives from its sexual or excretory 
meaning.”55 Furthermore, the FCC referenced the difficulty in 
certain cases of determining whether a word is being used in an 
expletive or literal sense.56 Finally, the FCC believed that 
“categorically requiring repeated use of expletives in order to find 
material indecent is inconsistent with [its] general approach to 
indecency enforcement, which stresses the critical nature of 
context.”57 Such a requirement would “permit broadcasters to air 
expletives at all hours of a day so long as they did so one at a time.”58 
 
 50. Id.; see Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads. Between Feb. 2, 2002 and 
Mar. 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299 (2006) [hereinafter Remand Order]. 
 51. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1808–10. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Cher’s use of the “F-Word,” the FCC argued, involved a description or reference to 
“a sexual act as a metaphor to express hostility to her critics. The fact that she was not literally 
suggesting that people engage in sexual activities does not necessarily remove the use of the 
term from the realm of descriptions or depictions.” Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 
13324 (2006). Nicole Richie, for her part, had used the “F-Word” as an expletive, but had 
also used the “S-Word” as a literal description of excrement. Id. at 13307–08. Furthermore, 
the FCC believed her language could have been indecent under the previous standard because 
it involved more than one offensive word and appeared to be deliberate. Id. 
 54. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1809 (citing Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 
13299, 13308 ¶ 23, 13325 ¶ 61). 
 55. Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13308 (2006). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 13309. 
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III. HARD LOOK REVIEW 
Needless to say, Fox was not happy with the FCC’s order. Even 
though the FCC had not imposed sanctions for the offending 
broadcasts, Fox, joined by other intervening broadcasters, appealed 
to the Second Circuit. The Court of Appeals set aside the agency’s 
orders after finding the FCC’s change of policy in the Golden Globes 
Order to be arbitrary and capricious in violation of the 
Administrative Procedure Act.59 A sharply divided Supreme Court, 
however, reversed the Second Circuit, and reinstated the FCC’s 
orders.60 While the Justices agreed that no heightened scrutiny was 
needed for agency changes in policy, they strongly disagreed on what 
the “arbitrary and capricious” standard required in this context.61  
In deciding FCC v. Fox Television Stations, all of the Justices 
agreed that the decision required application of the principles of 
“hard look” review.62 This method of reviewing informal agency 
policymaking decisions by asking whether the agency took a “‘hard 
look’ at the salient problems . . . and . . . genuinely engaged in 
reasoned decision-making,” originated in the Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit.63 But the current approach to arbitrary and 
capricious review was laid down by the Supreme Court in Motor 
Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n. v. State Farm.64  
In State Farm, the Court reviewed a decision by the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) rescinding its 
previously promulgated motor vehicle safety standards.65 In 
accordance with its mandate under the National Traffic and Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act, which directed the agency to issue motor vehicle 
safety standards, the NHTSA had developed a rule, also known as 
Standard 208, requiring auto manufacturers to include passive 
restraints in new vehicles.66 At various stages in the rulemaking 
process, the regulation included requirements for airbags, automatic 
seatbelts, ignition interlocks for manual seatbelts, and manually 
 
 59. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 454 (2007), rev’d 129 S. Ct. 
1800 (2009). 
 60. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 64. 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 33–37. 
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detachable automatic seatbelts.67 At times, the process was politically 
charged, with Congress stepping in to ban the unpopular ignition 
interlock system and asserting a potential legislative veto on “any 
safety standard that could be satisfied by a system other than 
seatbelts.”68 The President also appeared to have stepped into the 
controversy, as Justice O’Connor recognized that “the agency’s 
changed view of the standard seems to be related to the election of a 
new President of a different political party.”69 
After a “complex and convoluted” rulemaking process, the 
agency finally rescinded its adopted rule.70 The final rule had 
mandated the phasing in of passive restraints, but left discretion with 
automakers in determining whether to use airbags or automatic 
seatbelts.71 In explaining the rescission, the agency argued “it was no 
longer able to find . . . that the automatic restraint requirement 
would produce significant safety benefits.”72 The Supreme Court, 
however, found the agency’s reasoning insufficient and directed it to 
“consider the matter further or adhere to or amend Standard 208 
along lines which its analysis supports.”73  
The Court struck down the agency’s rescission as arbitrary and 
capricious because the stated reasons for the decision did not support 
the result. After automakers largely opted to comply with the 
regulation by installing automatic belts rather than airbags, the 
agency determined that the “detachable automatic belts will not 
attain anticipated safety benefits because so many individuals will 
detach the mechanism.”74 The Court, however, did not see how this 
conclusion, even if true, would justify a complete rescission of the 
rule. According to the Court, this conclusion 
standing alone . . . would not justify any more than an amendment 
of Standard 208 to disallow compliance by means of the one 
technology which will not provide effective passenger protection. It 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 36. 
 69. Id. at 59 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 70. Id. at 34 (majority opinion). 
 71. Id. at 37. 
 72. Id. at 38. 
 73. Id. at 34. 
 74. Id. at 47. 
DO NOT DELETE 4/16/2010  3:52 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
698 
does not cast doubt on the need for a passive restraint standard or 
upon the efficacy of airbag technology.75 
State Farm established two important principles. First, the Court 
held that rescissions of agency action should be treated the same as 
positive agency action, and because a 
“settled course of behavior embodies the agency’s informed 
judgment that, by pursuing that course, it will carry out the policies 
committed to it by Congress[,]” . . . an agency changing its course 
by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for 
the change beyond that which may be required when an agency 
does not act in the first instance.76 
Second, the Court confirmed that when agencies exercise discretion 
to make policy, they must provide a reasoned explanation connecting 
their findings with the decisions they make.77 In determining 
whether an agency has met this standard, courts must ask whether  
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it 
to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter 
to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could 
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.78 
Thus, while a change in policy does not require a stricter standard of 
review than that applied to initial agency policy decisions, the agency 
must give valid reasons for making the change. 
State Farm’s test for arbitrary and capricious review suggests that 
agency decisions should be guided only by agency expertise informed 
by a rigorous investigation of available evidence. And while lower 
courts have upheld agency decisions based on policy considerations 
when factual findings are unavailable,79 agencies generally justify 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 41–42 (quoting Atchison T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 
800, 807–08 (1973)). 
 77. Id. at 34 (“Briefly summarized, we hold that the agency failed to present an 
adequate basis and explanation for rescinding the passive restraint requirement and that the 
agency must either consider the matter further or adhere to or amend Standard 208 along lines 
which its analysis supports.”). 
 78. Id. at 43. 
 79. See, e.g., Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 956 F.2d 309, 315–16 
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (upholding a decision by the Federal Highway Administration (FHA) to 
require inspections of underwater bridge members every five years (the period recommended 
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their policy decisions in technocratic, scientific terms.80 Political 
influences might motivate an agency to decide to address a particular 
problem, but State Farm indicates that they should not provide the 
sole justification for a final decision. 
However, in spite of State Farm’s direction that political 
considerations may not, by themselves, formally justify agency policy 
decisions, hard look review may not always effectively deter agencies 
from basing their decisions on political factors in practice. First, in 
some cases the agency may have insufficient data to make any 
decision. In those instances, even outright recognition of political 
motivation may be sufficient to justify the agency action.81 In other 
cases, the evidence might support more than one outcome. As long 
as the agency can justify its choice between alternatives with a 
rational explanation based on the evidence, it may hide the fact that 
political preferences tipped the scale one way or the other. In these 
instances, hard look review may not effectively deter essentially 
political decisions to the fullest extent.  
The level of deterrence possible may depend, however, on how 
rigorous courts are in analyzing the logic of agency decisions. For 
example, if an agency selects one alternative for political reasons 
when evidence or reason weigh more heavily in favor of another 
alternative, we might expect to find fallacious arguments in the 
agency’s explanation for its decision. If courts demand strictly logical 
explanations, then agencies may have fewer opportunities to mask 
their essentially political decisions. If, however, courts are willing to 
tolerate a degree of fallacious argument in finding an agency 
explanation rational, then agencies may often succeed in placing 
significant weight on political considerations. 
IV. INFORMAL FALLACIES IN FCC V. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS 
FCC v. Fox Television Stations is significant because it signals a 
willingness on the part of the Supreme Court to tolerate logical 
errors in agency reasoning, at least when the basis for a decision 
turns on the construction of judicial precedent rather than factual 
 
by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials) even though FHA 
did not have any factual findings to support its decision). 
 80. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 5, 5 n.4 (2009). 
 81. See Ctr. for Auto Safety, 956 F.2d at 315–16. 
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findings. Every Supreme Court Justice agreed that the FCC’s 
decision to abandon its fleeting expletives policy required a reasoned 
explanation under State Farm, but the majority ignored or even 
endorsed several logically fallacious arguments that the FCC 
included in its Golden Globes Order and Remand Order. This 
willingness to tolerate logical error is particularly significant in light 
of the Court’s explicit recognition that the FCC had reached its 
decision under political pressure from Congress. While it may be too 
soon to say that agencies have been granted a broad license to base 
their decisions on political preferences, the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in this case almost certainly reinforced agencies’ perceptions that 
their decisions need not be “model[s] for agency explanation”82 in 
order to survive “a ‘searching and careful’ review by the courts.”83  
A. Logical Errors in the FCC Orders 
The FCC’s Golden Globes Order and Remand Order provide 
several explanations for its decision to abandon the fleeting expletive 
exception to the prohibition on broadcast indecency and profanity. 
Three areas of the FCC’s decision, in particular, are problematic. 
First, its explanation for abandoning the distinction between literal 
and nonliteral uses of offensive words relies on appeals to authority, 
vicious abstraction, and irrelevant arguments. Second, the FCC’s 
decision to change its policy because the fleeting expletive exception 
required viewers to suffer the “first blow” indulges in a fallacious 
slippery slope argument and also focuses on the wrong question. 
Finally, its decision that the new policy was constitutional entirely 
avoids relevant arguments. 
1. Abandoning the distinction between literal and nonliteral usage 
In supporting its new policy, Justice Scalia found that the FCC 
had reasoned that “it made no sense to distinguish between literal 
and nonliteral uses of offensive words, requiring repetitive use to 
render only the latter indecent.”84 However, while the Court found 
this to be a rational reason for the FCC to “expand[] the scope of its 
 
 82. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1824 (2009) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 83. Id. (quoting Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 
(1971)). 
 84. Id. at 1812. 
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enforcement activity,”85 there is room to doubt the soundness of the 
FCC’s argument. 
It is not clear why a distinction between literal and nonliteral 
uses of offensive words makes no sense. In the Golden Globes Order, 
the FCC had argued that the “F-Word” always describes or depicts 
sexual activity,86 and in the Remand Order it explained that this is 
because “the word’s power to insult and offend derives from its 
sexual meaning.”87 But the FCC’s bald assertion that “given the core 
meaning of the ‘F-Word,’ any use of that word or a variation, in any 
context”88 describes or depicts sexual activity does not make it so. 
And at no point has the FCC offered an explanation for why every 
use of the “F-Word” must “fall[] within the first prong of [its] 
indecency definition” other than its belief that the “F-Word” bears 
an inherently sexual connotation.89 
In the Golden Globes Order, the FCC supported its conclusion by 
appealing to the authority of its original opinion in Pacifica, which, 
it noted, had been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court.90 While 
agency decisions may legitimately rely on agency precedent, and 
indeed may be set aside for ignoring relevant precedent,91 the FCC’s 
reliance on its 1975 Pacifica decision in this case is unfounded. In 
Pacifica, the FCC explicitly noted that its conclusion was made by 
applying a number of considerations to a monologue, which, in its 
context, had used those offensive, sexually charged words in a way 
that actually did describe sexual and excretory activity and organs.92 
While the FCC’s original order in Pacifica did categorically declare 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Golden Globes Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4978 (2004). 
 87. Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13323 (2006). 
 88. Golden Globes Order, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4978 (emphasis added). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See, e.g., Lemoyne-Owen Coll. v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55, 60–61 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(“An agency is by no means required to distinguish every precedent cited to it by an aggrieved 
party. . . . But where, as here, a party makes a significant showing that analogous cases have 
been decided differently, the agency must do more than simply ignore that argument.”). 
 92. See Citizen’s Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 
94, ¶ 14 (1975) (“Applying these considerations to the language used in the monologue broadcast 
by Pacifica’s station WBAI, in New York, the Commission concludes that words such as ‘fuck,’ 
‘shit,’ ‘piss,’ ‘motherfucker,’ ‘cocksucker,’ ‘cunt’ and ‘tit’ depict sexual and excretory activities 
and organs in a manner patently offensive by contemporary community standards for the 
broadcast medium and are accordingly ‘indecent’ when broadcast on radio or television.” 
(emphasis added)). 
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that “words such as ‘fuck,’ . . . depict sexual and excretory activities 
and organs in a manner patently offensive by contemporary 
community standards for the broadcast medium,”93 it made that 
statement in the context of a daytime broadcast of an unquestionably 
lewd comedy routine. If Pacifica’s broad language did mean that any 
use of the “F-Word” always depicts or describes sexual or excretory 
activities, then it probably committed the fallacy of division—it 
would have based its conclusion that a particular offensive word is 
always indecent on the premise that Carlin’s monologue was 
indecent as a whole. On the other hand, if Pacifica merely stands for 
the proposition that use of the “F-Word” is indecent when it actually 
describes or depicts sexual activities, then the FCC’s reliance on 
Pacifica’s broad language is a vicious abstraction because it ignores 
the context of the language in Pacifica. 
Furthermore, the authority of the FCC’s Pacifica decision seems 
questionable considering the narrowness of the Supreme Court 
opinion that upheld it94 and the FCC’s subsequent interpretation of 
the Supreme Court’s opinion. Following Pacifica, the FCC took the 
position that First Amendment principles act as a significant 
constraint on enforcement of Congress’s policy.95 In a 1978 order, 
the FCC proclaimed: 
With regard to “indecent” or “profane” utterances, the First 
Amendment and the “no censorship” provision of Section 326 of 
the Communications Act severely limit any role by the Commission 
and the courts in enforcing the proscription contained in Section 
1464. The Supreme Court’s decision in FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation . . . , decided July 3, 1978, affords this Commission no 
general prerogative to intervene in any case where words similar or 
identical to those in Pacifica are broadcast over a licensed radio or 
television station. We intend strictly to observe the narrowness of 
the Pacifica holding.96 
Because the FCC’s Pacifica decision generally, and the language 
cited from that decision specifically, are less than mandatory, the 
FCC’s appeal to authority in this case is fallacious. A careful review 
would question the adequacy of this reasoning to support the FCC’s 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. See supra Part II.A. 
 95. See Application of WGBH Educ. Found., 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, ¶ 10 (1978). 
 96. Id. 
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rather drastic change. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ignored the 
logical errors in this explanation and upheld the FCC’s decision. 
The FCC’s explanation supporting its abandonment of the 
literal/nonliteral distinction relied heavily on its Pacifica decision, 
but it did eventually provide somewhat more than a blatant appeal to 
authority. In the Golden Globes Order, the FCC’s argument was 
entirely conclusory: “[W]e believe that, given the core meaning of 
the ‘F-Word,’ any use of that word . . . inherently has a sexual 
connotation, and therefore [depicts or describes sexual activities].”97 
But in Fox Television Stations, the FCC expounded somewhat on this 
reasoning, arguing that the “F-Word”’s “power to ‘intensify’ and 
offend derives from its implicit sexual meaning.”98 Furthermore, the 
FCC noted that “the first dictionary definition of the ‘F-Word’ is 
sexual in nature.”99  
But even assuming the FCC is correct, the fact that a word’s 
power to offend derives from its sexual meaning does not inevitably 
lead to the conclusion that the word necessarily depicts or describes 
sexual activity in any context. Speakers may use strong or offensive 
language to express the magnitude of their feelings on a particular 
topic or to cope with pain100 or, perhaps, simply to convey a persona 
of badassness. For instance, it may be offensive to many people to 
describe a music award as “fucking brilliant,” but it takes a stretch of 
the imagination to conjure up a sexual mental image from that 
comment. When the speaker does not intend to describe or depict 
sexual activities or organs, and the listeners, while shocked or 
offended, do not receive a sexual message, it is nonsensical to 
conclude that the word does, in fact, convey a sexual message simply 
because of one of its dictionary definitions.101 Of course, there may 
 
 97. Golden Globes Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4978 (2004). 
 98. Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13304–05 (2006) (citing Robert F. 
Bloomquist, The F-Word: A Jurisprudential Taxonomy of American Morals (In a Nutshell), 40 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 65, 98 (1999)). The citation to Bloomquist without more is yet another 
appeal to authority. 
 99. Id. at 13304 (citing AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 559 (4th ed. 
2002) (defining the “F-Word” as “1: to have sexual intercourse with”). 
 100. As anyone who has hit his or her thumb with a hammer can attest. 
 101. The fact that the F-Word’s “first” definition is sexual is irrelevant. As Stephen 
Mouritsen has observed, dictionary definitions are rarely organized by hierarchical significance 
and those dictionaries that do attempt to put “core” definitions first have no scientifically 
defensible methodology for their ordering. Stephen Mouritsen, Comment, The Dictionary Is 
Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a New Way Forward in the Resolution of Lexical 
Ambiguity, 2010 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming). As a matter of common sense, I am willing to 
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be cases where it is unclear whether the usage is literal or 
nonliteral,102 but this does not lead to the conclusion that the 
distinction makes no sense. Rather, it indicates that the distinction 
may sometimes be difficult to draw. 
In spite of these flaws, the Supreme Court endorsed the FCC’s 
arguments. Speaking for the majority, Justice Scalia concluded 
without any discussion that “[i]t was certainly reasonable to 
determine that it made no sense to distinguish between literal and 
nonliteral uses of offensive words . . . .”103 Justice Breyer, on the 
other hand, assumed the validity of the FCC’s argument but could 
not see how the argument explained the FCC’s decision to change: 
“The FCC was aware of the coarseness of the ‘image’ the first time 
around.”104 Further, the FCC had originally made the distinction to 
avoid constitutional problems of censorship, and “[s]imply to 
announce that the words, whether used descriptively or as expletives, 
call forth similar ‘images’ is not to address those reasons.”105 Overall, 
the Court’s highly deferential approach to the FCC’s argument 
signals that agencies may indulge in fallacious reasoning to bolster 
their decisions when more sound arguments are unavailable. 
2. Protecting the listener from the “first blow” of offensive language 
The majority in Fox Television Stations also accepted the FCC’s 
argument that the fleeting expletive policy should be abandoned 
 
concede that the F-Word’s “core” meaning is sexual. However, when the context of a 
statement clearly shows that a different meaning is intended, I fail to see how, as a matter of 
logic, the core meaning should take precedence anyway. 
 102. Even while eschewing the literal/nonliteral distinction, the FCC argued that Cher’s 
use of the “F-Word” during the 2002 Billboard Music Awards was literal: 
In this case, Cher did more than use the “F-Word” as a mere interjection or 
intensifier. Rather, she used the word to describe or reference a sexual act as a 
metaphor to express hostility to her critics. The fact that she was not literally 
suggesting that people engage in sexual activities does not necessarily remove the 
use of the term from the realm of descriptions or depictions. 
Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13324 (2006). Justice Scalia characterized the FCC’s 
explanation of why Cher’s statement would have violated its earlier policy as “not entirely 
convincing,” but nevertheless superfluous. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 
1812 (2009). This is one example where it might be difficult to distinguish between literal and 
expletive uses of offensive words. However, the FCC’s argument appears to tacitly admit that 
“interjection[s] or intensifier[s]” are rarely, if ever, meant to be taken literally. Remand Order, 
21 F.C.C.R. at 13324. 
 103. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1812. 
 104. Id. at 1838 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 105. Id. 
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because prime-time broadcasts of offensive language require the 
listener to suffer the “first blow.”106 This idea stems from the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Pacifica that, because radio broadcasts 
intrude into the privacy of the home where audiences are constantly 
tuning in or out, the “individual’s right to be left alone plainly 
outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.”107 According 
to the Court, “To say that one may avoid further offense by turning 
off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the 
remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow.”108 
In applying the “first blow” rationale to the context of fleeting 
expletives in the Remand Order, the FCC worried that a per se 
exception would allow broadcasters “to air expletives at all hours of a 
day so long as they did so one at a time.”109 In Justice Scalia’s view, 
this reasoning appeared to build upon the FCC’s worry, expressed in 
the Golden Globes Order, that routine non-action against fleeting 
expletives “would ‘likely lead to more widespread use of the offensive 
language.’”110 
The FCC’s primary argument—that a per se exception would 
allow broadcasts of fleeting expletives at all hours of the day—is 
sound. However, the contention that broadcasters will seize on the 
exception and proliferate the use of offensive language is a fallacious, 
slippery slope argument. As Justice Breyer observed, the FCC’s 
fleeting expletive policy had been in effect for twenty-five years, yet 
 
 106. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1812–13 (2009); see also Remand 
Order, 21 F.C.C.R. ¶ 25. 
 107. FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (citing Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 
U.S. 728 (1970)). 
 108. Id. at 748–49. The “first blow” argument perhaps employs the informal fallacy of 
false analogy. Speech is qualitatively different from physical assault. Indeed, in public settings, 
the Supreme Court does say that the remedy for such an assault is to run away after the first 
blow. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (“Those in the Los Angeles courthouse 
could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities [caused by offensive language 
on Cohen’s jacket] simply by averting their eyes.”). On a basic level, Pacifica upheld 
restrictions on radio transmission not because offensive speech is always analogous to physical 
assault, but because that assault on the sensibilities occurred within the privacy of a person’s 
home. Even if it is technically fallacious, however, this analogy hits rhetorical paydirt. Because 
individuals do have rights to be free from offensive language in their homes, the analogy that 
failed in Cohen works wonderfully here. 
 109. Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13309 (2006). 
 110. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1812–13 (quoting Golden 
Globes Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4979 (2004)). 
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the FCC had presented no evidence that broadcasters used it as a 
license to air offensive language one program at a time.111 
The majority recognized the slippery slope quality of the FCC’s 
fear but accepted the argument anyway. Justice Scalia concluded that 
“[i]t is surely rational (if not inescapable) to believe that a safe 
harbor for single words would ‘likely lead to more widespread use of 
the offensive language.’”112 He even endorsed the FCC’s slippery 
slope argument, arguing that “even in the absence of evidence, the 
agency’s predictive judgment (which merits deference) makes entire 
sense. . . . [The prediction] seems to us an exercise in logic rather 
than clairvoyance.”113 Thus, the majority opinion signals that courts 
should, at least in some circumstances, defer to agency predictions of 
negative consequences stemming from an existing policy—and 
should accordingly uphold departures from that policy on the basis 
of such predictions—even when the prediction is unsupported by any 
evidence, and the likelihood of it actually occurring is low. 
While the FCC’s “first blows” rationale relies on a slippery slope 
argument, perhaps the more serious problem is that it answers the 
wrong question. Justice Breyer observed that the idea of “first 
blows” was available to the FCC when it first adopted its fleeting 
expletives policy, but the FCC adopted the policy anyway, 
presumably to avoid the First Amendment issues that would 
accompany stricter enforcement.114 Therefore, while the “first blow” 
rationale does support the FCC’s policy choice as such, it does not, 
by itself, support the decision to change policy.115 If the question is 
whether the FCC was justified in changing course,116 its discussion of 
 
 111. Id. at 1839 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 112. Id. at 1812–13 (majority opinion). 
 113. Id. at 1814. 
 114. See id. at 1839 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 115. See id. 
 116. State Farm appeared to direct courts to focus on the reason for change in asking 
whether a shift in policy is arbitrary or capricious. It held that “an agency changing its course 
by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which 
may be required when an agency does not act in the first instance.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Assoc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983). Justice Scalia, however, 
rejected the proposition that an agency must always focus on the fact of change: 
[T]he agency need not always provide a more detailed justification than what would 
suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate. Sometimes it must—when, for 
example, its new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict those which 
underlay its prior policy . . . . In such cases it is not that further justification is 
demanded by the mere fact of policy change; but that a reasoned explanation is 
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first blows is irrelevant. Rather, the FCC should have focused on 
why the first blows argument did not caution against a fleeting 
expletives exception originally, but now does. 
Overall, the FCC’s reasoning that the fleeting expletives 
exception must be abandoned to avoid subjecting children to the 
first blow of offensive language is, at best, moderately persuasive. 
The FCC employed a slippery slope argument and ignored the 
question of whether a first blow rationale justified a change in policy 
in light of the reasons for adopting its original policy. These 
arguments were, however, persuasive enough to convince five 
members of the Supreme Court not to set aside its orders as arbitrary 
and capricious. The Court’s decision signals that agencies may 
commit errors in reasoning and still receive substantial deference. 
3. Constitutional questions 
The FCC’s decision to abandon its fleeting expletives exception 
has potentially serious implications for the constitutional right to 
freedom of speech. Most obviously, the new standard appears to 
prohibit any intentional broadcast of the “F-Word” or other, 
similarly offensive language.117 However, even assuming the 
 
needed for disregarding the facts and circumstances that underlay or were 
engendered by the prior policy.  
Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1811 (majority opinion). Nevertheless, if the agency’s 
action may be cast as a decision to change a policy rather than a decision to adopt a policy, and 
State Farm requires a reasoned explanation for the decision itself, then it makes sense to say 
that the appropriate question is whether the explanation supports the decision to change policy 
and not just whether the explanation supports the decision to adopt the policy. Justice Breyer 
offered an extreme but insightful example supporting this point of view: 
To explain a change requires more than setting forth reasons why the new policy is a 
good one. It also requires the agency to answer the question, “Why did you 
change?” And a rational answer to this question typically requires a more complete 
explanation than would prove satisfactory were change itself not at issue. An 
(imaginary) administrator explaining why he chose a policy that requires driving on 
the right-side, rather than the left-side, of the road might say, “Well, one side 
seemed as good as the other, so I flipped a coin.” But even assuming the rationality 
of that explanation for an initial choice, that explanation is not at all rational if 
offered to explain why the administrator changed driving practice, from right-side to 
left-side, 25 years later. 
Id. at 1830–31 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 117. Whether such broadcasts actually are entitled to First Amendment protection may 
very well be a close question. The FCC was probably correct in its observation that Pacifica 
left the question open. See Golden Globes Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4982 (2004). However, in 
Fox Television Stations, Justice Thomas expressed doubts on the continuing viability of both 
Pacifica and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), in that they carve out 
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constitutionality of that prohibition, the rule also has a potential 
chilling effect on broadcasts that would warrant protection. In 
particular, small local broadcasters who cannot afford “bleeping” 
technology118 may not be willing to provide coverage of live events 
for fear of accidentally broadcasting a fleeting expletive.119 Despite 
these concerns, the FCC concluded that the First Amendment does 
not forbid the new rule. And while the FCC’s justification for its 
conclusion that the new policy is constitutional includes instances of 
fallacious reasoning, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s action. 
The main problem with the FCC’s treatment of the 
constitutionality of its action was pointed out by Justice Breyer in his 
dissent to Fox Television Stations. He argued that the FCC’s 
reasoning on the First Amendment implications of its decision was 
deficient because it was entirely nonexistent.120 While the FCC did 
produce “‘four full pages of small-type, single-spaced text’”121 
defending the constitutionality of broadcast indecency regulations, 
that discussion was entirely irrelevant to whether the agency could 
justify its change in policy. In fact, the FCC’s discussion of 
constitutional issues in the Remand Order does little more than 
reject the petitioner’s argument that Pacifica itself has been so 
eroded as to be no longer viable.122 The FCC’s discussion certainly 
supports its argument that Pacifica remains good law,123 but it does 
 
the broadcast medium for different First Amendment treatment. See Fox Television Stations, 
129 S. Ct. at 1819–20 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I write separately . . . to note the 
questionable viability of the two precedents that support the FCC’s assertion of constitutional 
authority to regulate the programming at issue in this case.”). While Thomas was alone in his 
concurrence, it would not be surprising if other Justices who were unwilling to venture any 
views on the First Amendment question without full briefing would, given an appropriate case, 
agree that Pacifica and Red Lion have outlived their usefulness. Scholars have also criticized 
those cases and called for their abandonment. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Tucker Lecture, 
Law and Medium Symposium, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1449, 1453–54 (2009) (arguing that, 
with the advent of the internet, medium-by-medium approach to the First Amendment no 
longer makes any sense); see also Robert Corn-Revere, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.: 
Awaiting the Next Act, 2008–09 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 295, 313–315 (observing that much has 
changed since the Court decided Pacifica, including advancements in technology and 
developments in the law governing indecency).  
 118. See infra notes 126–28 and accompanying text. 
 119. See Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1835–37 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 120. Id. at 1834 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 121. See id. (quoting plurality opinion, 129 S. Ct. at 1817–18). 
 122. 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13316–21 (2006). 
 123. See Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1834 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In 
[responding to industry arguments that changes in the nature of the broadcast industry made 
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not explain why the FCC should revise its understanding of the 
scope of permissible restrictions on speech that Pacifica approved. 
The FCC’s observation that its decision was “‘not inconsistent with 
the Supreme Court ruling in Pacifica’ . . . [does] not acknowledge 
that an entirely different understanding of Pacifica underlay the 
FCC’s earlier policy.”124 
In sum, Justice Breyer’s complaint is not that Pacifica necessarily 
requires a different result—perhaps the FCC could have articulated 
valid reasons for changing its reading of Pacifica—but rather that the 
agency failed to explain why it once believed Pacifica required a 
different result but no longer does.  
Yet, even if the FCC had provided an explanation for 
reinterpreting Pacifica, it would still have been necessary to address 
the constitutional question as a matter of first impression. Until the 
Golden Globes Order, the FCC had never found the use of a fleeting 
expletive to be indecent, so it had never had to decide whether such 
a finding would be constitutional. The FCC is charged with the 
responsibility to enforce the prohibition on indecent speech, but also 
with a responsibility not to censor the airwaves. It, therefore, has a 
statutory responsibility to consider and decide First Amendment 
questions when its policies might interfere with freedom of 
expression.125 Simply announcing that a decision with serious 
constitutional implications is “not inconsistent” with a Supreme 
Court case that did not even address the question abdicates that 
responsibility. 
According to Justice Breyer, one aspect in particular deserved 
greater treatment by the FCC—the chilling effect the FCC’s new 
policy would have on small local broadcasters’ ability to provide live 
coverage of local events.126 Broadcasters had contended through 
 
all indecency regulation unconstitutional, the FCC] repeatedly reaffirmed its view that 
Pacifica remains good law.”). 
 124. Id. (quoting Golden Globes Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4982 (2004)). 
 125. See The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—Leading Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV. 352, 360–
61 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme Court should have reached the constitutional question in 
Fox Television Stations because “Congress essentially commanded the FCC to rely on sound 
constitutional groundwork when it enacted 47 U.S.C. § 326”). Whether the Court should 
have reached the constitutional question itself is beyond the scope of this Note. However, the 
FCC unquestionably should have made a constitutional determination and its reliance on 
Pacifica was insufficient to support its decision that the new policy was constitutional even 
though Pacifica itself does not require a finding that the new policy was unconstitutional. 
 126. See Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1835–37 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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every stage of the litigation that the FCC’s new policy would create a 
substantial burden on small local broadcasters. They complained that 
“the costs of bleeping/delay systems, up to $100,000 for installation 
and annual operation, place that technology beyond the financial 
reach of many smaller independent local stations.”127 With a threat of 
fines up to $325,000 for a broadcast of indecent speech, some local 
broadcasters had already halted coverage of “‘live events where 
crowds are present . . . unless they affect matters of public safety or 
convenience.’”128 
The FCC, however, said nothing in response to these claims. 
Rather, it responded only to general objections to the mandatory use 
of delay systems, arguing that, at least for live awards shows, a delay 
of several seconds does not “significantly implicate[] First 
Amendment values.”129 Therefore, the FCC concluded that 
“[h]olding Fox responsible for airing indecent material in this case 
does not place live broadcasts at risk or impose undue burdens on 
broadcasters.”130 In syllogistic terms, the argument may be restated 
as follows: a delay of several seconds in the broadcast of a live awards 
show does not implicate the First Amendment; the offensive 
language in question occurred during the broadcast of live awards 
shows; therefore, holding Fox responsible does not place live 
broadcasts at risk or impose undue burdens on broadcasters. 
This argument is a non sequitur. First, the premise—that 
requiring a delay for live awards shows broadcast by a major 
network—does not necessarily support the conclusion that non-
awards show broadcasts by other broadcasters are not at risk or 
 
 127. Id. at 1835–36. 
 128. Id. at 1836. 
 129. Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13313 (2006). The FCC noted that the 
Billboard Music Awards cases did not deal with breaking news or sports programming. Id. at 
13313 n.102. However, it did reverse its earlier indecency determination against CBS for 
broadcasting the word, “bullshitter,” during a live interview on the Early Show. Id. at 13326–
28. While the complaints had characterized the interview as no more than promotion for 
CBS’s entertainment program, Survivor: Vanuatu, the FCC deferred to CBS’s contention that 
the broadcast was a bona fide news interview. The FCC stated, “in light of the important First 
Amendment interests at stake as well as the crucial role that context plays in our indecency 
determinations, it is imperative that we proceed with the utmost restraint when it comes to 
news programming.” Id. at 13327. It is worth noting that the FCC’s willingness to brave the 
treacherous grounds of distinguishing between “news programming” and entertainment or 
promotional programming—retaining a fleeting expletive exception in the one but not the 
other—creates some tension with its conclusion that it makes no sense to distinguish between 
literal and expletive uses of offensive words. 
 130. Id. at 13313. 
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subject to an undue burden. The argument might be more 
persuasive if the FCC could assume that all broadcasters have access 
to delay equipment, but parties before the FCC explicitly refuted the 
assumption. Thus, the argument ignores the scenario actually put 
forward that might render the rule facially invalid. 
Neither can the FCC’s conclusion be sustained by its promise to 
exercise caution when reviewing broadcasts of news or sports 
programming.131 Local stations that lack access to delay/bleeping 
equipment may want to cover live events that would not qualify as 
news or sports programming.132 And even if a particular broadcast 
does qualify as news or sports programming, a guarantee of caution 
does not equal the absence of risk.  
Thus, the FCC’s assurance that its new policy does not place live 
broadcasts by broadcasters that cannot afford delay/bleeping 
equipment at risk seems fairly hollow, and the behavior of small 
broadcasters following the FCC’s new rule reflects a disquieting lack 
of confidence in the FCC’s reasoning. In spite of the order’s 
language, the new rule does impose a risk on live broadcasts, and the 
FCC should have offered an explanation for why imposing that risk 
is constitutional. 
Notwithstanding these errors in the FCC’s reasoning, a majority 
of the Supreme Court did not find the “plight of the small local 
broadcaster”133 problematic. While Justice Scalia’s specific responses 
to the dissent’s arguments commanded only four votes,134 the 
majority did specifically decline Justice Breyer’s suggestion to 
remand the case so that the agency could “‘reconsider its policy 
 
 131. See id. (“This case does not involve breaking news coverage that Fox and other 
broadcasters have traditionally presented in so-called ‘real time.’”). 
 132. Furthermore, whether a particular broadcast qualifies as news or sports 
programming may sometimes present a difficult question. See supra note 129. 
 133. See Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 1818. 
 134. See id. at 1815–19. Justice Kennedy agreed with the bulk of Justice Scalia’s opinion, 
but did not join the portion of the opinion refuting Justice Breyer’s arguments. In his 
concurrence, Justice Kennedy asserted that the FCC had merely changed its reading of Pacifica 
and, while “[t]he reasons the agency announces for this change are not so precise, detailed, or 
elaborate as to be a model for agency explanation[,] . . . the reasons for its action were the sort 
of reasons an agency may consider and act upon.” Id. at 1824 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment). Even though it does not have the full weight of a majority, 
Justice Scalia’s defense of the FCC decision in the plurality portion of the decision indicates the 
willingness of a substantial portion of the Court to tolerate and even endorse logical error in 
administrative policymaking decisions. 
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decision in light of’ constitutional concerns.”135 The majority 
concluded such a remand would equate to “judicial arm-twisting or 
appellate review by the wagged finger.”136  
The plurality portion of Justice Scalia’s opinion goes much 
farther, however, in defending the FCC’s reasoning. Scalia first 
addressed Justice Breyer’s contention that the FCC failed to explain 
“‘why [it] changed its mind about the line that Pacifica draws or its 
policy’s relation to that line.’”137 According to Scalia, such an 
explanation is unnecessary: “Pacifica . . . drew no constitutional line; 
to the contrary it expressly declined to express any view on the 
constitutionality of prohibiting isolated indecency.”138 Scalia is 
correct that Pacifica did not draw any constitutional line, which 
makes his argument is persuasive, but the argument could well be 
criticized as a vicious abstraction. Justice Breyer’s characterization of 
Pacifica as drawing a “constitutional line” is imprecise, but when 
read in the context of his opinion as a whole, his argument is not so 
easily overcome. Breyer’s opinion did not argue that Pacifica itself 
had drawn a line, but rather that the FCC believed a line had been 
drawn and acted accordingly.139 Thus, Justice Breyer’s argument is 
not that one reading of Pacifica is correct, but rather that when an 
agency changes from a narrow interpretation of a Supreme Court 
opinion to a more constitutionally suspect interpretation, it should 
explain why the new approach is constitutional. 
Justice Scalia also defended the FCC against the “plight of the 
small local broadcaster.” In general, Justice Scalia’s tone is 
sarcastic—perhaps to minimize the concerns pointed out by Justice 
Breyer and to portray the opposing argument as frivolous. For 
instance, Justice Scalia expressed his doubt “that small-town 
broadcasters run a heightened risk of liability for indecent utterances. 
In programming that they originate, their down-home local guests 
 
 135. Id. at 1812 n.3 (majority opinion). 
 136. Id. This characterization of the dissent’s argument probably misses the point since 
Justice Breyer would demand only that the FCC provide a reasoned explanation for its 
decision, not that it reach any particular outcome. The majority apparently saw Justice Breyer’s 
argument as an attempt to address the constitutional questions that the Court wished to avoid. 
 137. Id. at 1817 (plurality portion of majority opinion) (quoting id. at 1834 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting)). 
 138. Id. 
 139. See id. at 1833 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The FCC . . . made clear that it thought 
that Justice Powell’s concurrence set forth a constitutional line that its indecency policy should 
embody.”). 
DO NOT DELETE 4/16/2010  3:52 PM 
687 FCC v. Fox Television Stations 
 713 
probably employ vulgarity less than big-city folks; and small-town 
stations generally cannot afford or cannot attract foul-mouthed 
glitteratae from Hollywood.”140 This argument not only attempts to 
poison the well by ridiculing the opposing argument, it also 
completely misconstrues the opposing argument. Justice Scalia 
confuses “small local broadcasters,” which might very well exist in 
the heart of Hollywood and other big cities, with “small-town 
broadcasters,” which, according to Justice Scalia, should have no 
problems with indecent language. Furthermore, just as the FCC 
avoided the scenarios that are most troubling, Justice Scalia’s 
argument ignores the major argument put forward. The live 
programming that the petitioners feared would be chilled was not so 
much “guest shows” as live local events—city council meetings, 
sporting events, community dance contests, and so forth.141 The 
plurality simply dismissed these concerns as unimportant or, at most, 
not urgent.142 
Arising out of sarcasm, Justice Scalia does make a fairly persuasive 
argument—that Justice Breyer’s concerns rely on a “demonstrably 
false assumption that the Remand Order makes no provision for the 
avoidance of unfairness—that the single-utterance prohibition will be 
invoked uniformly, in all situations.”143 This argument appears 
persuasive because, if correct, Justice Breyer’s position would be 
defeated from the outset. But, even if Justice Breyer did make that 
assumption (he probably does not) and the assumption is false (it 
probably is), Justice Breyer’s argument on the whole does not stand 
or fall on the assumption. Perhaps the FCC’s assurance that it 
“would consider the facts of each individual case” in determining 
“‘what, if any, remedy is appropriate’”144 is sufficient to prevent fines 
for broadcasts that are actually within First Amendment protection. 
However, it does not eliminate the risk that is most likely to chill 
 
 140. Id. at 1818 (plurality portion of majority opinion). 
 141. See id. at 1836 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 142. See id. at 1819 (plurality portion of majority opinion) (“Justice BREYER can safely 
defer his concern for those yeomen of the airwaves until we have before us a case that involves 
one.”). Justice Scalia’s move to defer the decision of a facial attack on the constitutionality of 
the FCC’s new rule is consistent with the Court’s unanimous decision not to reach 
constitutional questions in a challenge under the APA. The problem here is not that the rule 
should be set aside because it is constitutionally overbroad, but because the FCC failed to even 
consider an important argument. 
 143. Id. at 1818 (plurality portion of majority opinion). 
 144. Id. (quoting Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13313 (2006)).  
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expression—the risk of prosecution for allegedly indecent broadcasts. 
Justice Breyer’s main concern is not that small broadcasters will be 
treated unfairly in prosecutions, but that the threat of prosecution 
and punishment will cause self-censorship by small broadcasters who 
could not afford to risk even the possibility of an indecency fine. The 
FCC should have at least addressed this constitutional dilemma 
beyond a conclusory assertion that its decision would not “impose 
undue burdens on broadcasters.”145 Justice Scalia, however, would 
defer to the FCC’s conclusion without further support. 
Finally, Justice Scalia defends the FCC’s resolution of the First 
Amendment question by criticizing Justice Breyer for comparing the 
agency decision-making process to what would have been required 
had the agency engaged in notice and comment rulemaking.146 Scalia 
dismisses this argument by citing Vermont Yankee, which foreclosed 
attempts by courts to incorporate “all of the Administrative 
Procedure Act’s notice-and-comment procedural requirements into 
arbitrary-and-capricious review of adjudicatory decisions.”147 Justice 
Scalia’s appeal to Vermont Yankee is probably appropriate in refuting 
the premise he attributes to Justice Breyer. Vermont Yankee did, in 
fact, abolish the judicial practice of imposing upon agencies 
procedures not required by the APA.148  
However, Justice Scalia oversimplified Justice Breyer’s actual 
argument. While courts are not free to impose onerous procedures, 
arbitrary and capricious review requires a determination of whether 
the agency considered all “important aspect[s] of the problem.”149 
Because the reviewing court must make its determination by 
reference to the record developed by the agency,150 even informal 
proceedings (including adjudications) must develop an 
 
 145. See Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R at 13313. It is clear that the FCC thought this 
statement addressed the concerns regarding small broadcasters; the Remand Order included a 
footnote to the portion of the networks’ joint comments that raised the issue. See id. at 13313 
n.101 (citing Joint Comments of Fox Television Stations, Inc., CBS Broadcasting Inc., NBC 
Universal, Inc., and NBC Telemundo License Co., at 12–16). 
 146. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1819 n.8 (plurality portion of majority 
opinion). 
 147. Id. (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
435 U.S. 519, 545–49 (1978)). 
 148. See generally Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
 149. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1838 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Motor 
Vehicle Mfr. Assoc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
 150. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419–20 (1971). 
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administrative record sufficient to demonstrate that the agency 
considered all the important aspects of the problem.151 Justice 
Breyer’s argument is that the FCC orders failed to develop and rely 
upon such a record, and Justice Breyer probably referenced notice 
and comment rulemaking procedures simply to highlight the 
agency’s failures in this case.152 
In sum, the FCC’s explanations for its decision to abandon the 
fleeting expletives policy were riddled with logical error. Not only are 
the reasons for the new policy logically suspect, but more 
importantly, the reasons for the change and for why the new policy 
comports with the First Amendment are almost entirely absent. The 
Court’s decision appears to stand for the proposition that, at least in 
cases where an initial agency decision is merely based on a particular, 
nonexclusive, reading of Supreme Court precedent,153 the agency 
may select a different reading of that precedent without providing 
any rigorous discussion of potential constitutional problems 
attending the new policy. 
B. Political Motivations and Logical Error 
Overall, the logical flaws in the FCC’s reasoning cast suspicion 
on the claim that the Golden Globes Order and Remand Order are the 
products of an unbiased and logic-driven decision-making process. 
And if the decisions were not driven by logic, it seems likely that 
political preferences substituted as the motivating force. Indeed, as 
Justice Scalia observed, the Golden Globes Order came on the heels of 
hearings before the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications 
and the Internet wherein FCC Commissioners “were grilled about 
enforcement shortcomings.”154 
 
 151. See Center for Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 956 F.2d 309, 314 (D.C. Cir. 
1992). 
 152. See Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1838 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Here the 
agency did not make new policy through the medium of notice and comment proceedings. 
But the same failures here—where the policy is important, the significance of the issues clear, 
the failures near complete—should lead us to the same conclusion.”). 
 153. See id. at 1824 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(“The present case does not raise the concerns addressed in State Farm. Rather than base its 
prior policy on its knowledge of the broadcast industry and its audience, the FCC instead 
based its policy on what it considered to be our holding in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation . . . . 
But, as the opinion for the Court well explains, the FCC’s reasons for its action were the sort 
of reasons an agency may consider and act upon.”). 
 154. Id. at 1816 n.4 (plurality portion of majority opinion). 
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Assuming that politics, and not logic, motivated the FCC 
decision, the question remains whether political motivation is 
acceptable.155 While a plurality recognized some political pressure,156 
the majority upheld the orders because they were supported by 
sufficiently reasonable explanations, not because the Commissioners 
were directed to change the policy by those with political power over 
them. Had the FCC attempted to justify its orders simply by saying, 
“The House Subcommittee threatened to defund an important 
program unless we abandoned the fleeting expletives exception,” its 
decision probably would have been set aside as arbitrary and 
capricious, or possibly even as a violation of principles of separation 
of powers.157 The Court’s decision in Fox Television Stations appears 
to cling to the ideal that agency decisions will be justified by 
expertise and logic rather than politics. But its reference to the 
significant political pressure from Congress suggests that the Court 
recognizes a role for politics in agency action. Rather than 
developing the role political factors may legitimately play, the Court 
appears to have simply lowered the bar for what qualifies as a 
reasoned decision. While it may be too early to make definitive 
conclusions after one case, Fox Television Stations suggests that an 
agency might get away with making a decision solely for political 
reasons as long as it can provide a non-political explanation, even if 
the explanation relies on fallacious reasoning. As long as the agency’s 
explanation does not ignore prior factual findings that motivated an 
earlier contrary decision,158 courts may tolerate a fairly high degree of 
informal logical error. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Administrative agencies and independent agencies in particular, 
occupy a unique position in the American legal framework. On the 
 
 155. See supra text accompanying note 81.  
 156. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1816 n.4 (plurality portion of majority 
opinion). 
 157. The answer to a possible separation of powers challenge would be far from clear, but 
the argument would be that an agency wielding executive power cannot constitutionally take 
direction directly from Congress or any of its members. The separation of powers dilemma 
might be alleviated were the political direction to come from the President, but even in that 
case State Farm has been widely read to mean that agency decisions may not be justified solely 
by political considerations. See Watts, supra note 80, at 19–20. 
 158. See Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1824 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
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one hand, the Constitution provides little guidance on how agencies 
may exercise power or how much power they may exercise. Thus, 
broad authority within an agency gives rise to a well-founded fear of 
abuse. On the other hand, the political realities of modern life 
require authority to lie within administrations; without at least some 
agency authority, government might grind to a halt. 
Thus, while perhaps it must be accepted that agencies will wield 
great power, the American system demands that this power be 
constrained. Congress established a constraint on agency power by 
providing that any agency decision that is arbitrary, capricious, or an 
abuse of discretion may be reversed upon review in the courts. The 
Supreme Court gave this constraint meaning in State Farm, where it 
held that exercises of agency discretion must be supported by a 
reasoned explanation. However, at least in cases where agency action 
does not require factual findings, Fox Television Stations seems to 
suggest that the Court will grant significant leeway to logical error in 
an agency’s explanation for its actions, leaving the door open for 
agency decisions to be driven by politics rather than logic. 
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